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1. Scope 
 
The last two decades has seen a number of major changes in the way public transport 
services are delivered.  Whereas public monopolies long dominated service provision, 
with the roles of the regulator and service deliverer closely entwined, it is increasingly 
common to see the service delivery task passed to the private sector.  This process is 
usually driven by expectations of (1) lower costs to government from more efficient 
service delivery by the private sector and (2) better service delivery outcomes from a 
service provider more attuned to meeting customer needs. The public sector purchases 
operations and/or infrastructure services, instead of delivering them itself, with the 
private sector taking on various risks associated with service provision and being 
rewarded in some way for so doing. 
 
Great Britain led this process with its de-regulation of bus services outside of London in 
the mid 80s.  Complete de-regulation is unusual, the most common change being to see 
public sector service provision replaced by private provision by a single operator, who 
receives a franchise or concession to deliver services in a specified area (or route) for a 
specified period, usually with nominated service standards to be achieved.  Competitive 
tendering processes are commonly used to select the successful operator.   
 
With the regulator focusing on outcomes while retaining control of key elements like 
minimum service standards (specified in contracts), fare levels and with performance 
monitoring and delivery being undertaken by the private operator, the process can be 
seen as a form of public private partnership, even though the emphasis is typically on 
operations rather than on infrastructure (although infrastructure improvement, including 
rolling stock, may be part of the contracting requirements).   
 
This paper presents the views of two individuals who believe that opening public 
transport markets to greater competition is not the only path to delivering the two major 
intended outcomes of lower cost service provision and higher service quality through a 
public/private partnership.  This view has been strongly reinforced by experience in 
Victoria, where a notable failure of a public transport franchisee has recently occurred.  
 
The paper begins with a review of the recent franchising of train and tram services in 
Victoria, concluding that this has fallen well short of the expectations of those who 
drove the process.  It then 3 asks what lessons can be learnt from this failure and 
suggests areas in which efforts need to be focused to reduce the risks of repeat 
performances.   
 
 
2. Train and Tram Franchising in Victoria, Australia 
 
2.1 Context 
 
Melbourne, a city of about 3.5 million people, was the first, and remains the only, 
Australian city to franchise both its passenger train and tram networks.  The tram 
network is one of the most extensive in the world, comprising 240 kilometres of double 
track, about 80% of which operates on road space shared with motor traffic.  There were 
about 526 vehicles in the fleet at the time of privatisation.  The suburban rail network 
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had 336 kilometres of route length, 197 stations and about 150 train sets at that time.  
Both the tram and train fleets were generally acknowledged as being in need of a 
significant upgrade at the time of franchising.  Franchising also included the regional 
public transport system (V/Line passenger) then operated by the State. This included 
rail services operated on over 4,500 kilometres of track and some coach services.   The 
current paper focuses on the metropolitan services, not on V/Line. 
 
The franchise process was “competition for the market” and five businesses were 
offered: two metropolitan train services, two metropolitan tram services and one 
regional train/bus service.  These five businesses grew out of the State-owned Public 
Transport Commission and they had been corporatised as separate entities prior to sale. 
 
The franchising occurred in August 1999 and was expected to lead to: 
 
· substantial reductions in government subsidies (forecast to fall by about $160 
million annually in real terms over a 15 year period, on average)1; 
· significant upgrading of rolling stock; and 
· service improvements (driven by incentive components in the franchisees’ 
remuneration packages). 
 
Large patronage increases were also expected from franchising, with a patronage 
growth rate of 3.6% p.a. forecast for the 1999-2014 period, or 71% increase in total 
patronage (compared to 1.0% average annual increase achieved over the 1991-1999 
period).  This major increase in expected patronage growth rates was critical in the 
expected funding outcome, considered below.  
 
 
2.2 Objectives 
 
Reducing the public transport call on the public purse was a primary motive for 
franchising, which was part of a much wider push by the Victorian (and other 
Australian Governments) at the time to introduce increased competition into the supply 
of goods and services that had previously been publicly provided (e.g. 
telecommunications, gas and electricity). 
 
More generally, however, the then State Government set itself five goals when it began 
the franchising process: 
 
1. to secure a progressive improvement in the quality of services available to public 
transport users in the State; 
2. to secure a substantial and sustained increase in the number of passengers using 
the system; 
3. to minimise long term costs of public transport to the taxpayer; 
4. to transfer risk to the private sector; and 
5. to ensure that the highest safety standards were achieved. 
 
                                                          
1 Russell et al (2000), Table 4.  This table shows $1.82 billion expected savings over 4 metropolitan 
franchises and one regional franchise, presumably in 1999 prices (the price levels were not indicated in 
the report).  Making an allowance for varying lengths of franchises, the expected annual saving would be 
of the order of $160 million. 
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These objectives mirror a balance between financial and service delivery outcomes.  
Sitting behind the service delivery outcome objectives was a belief that a shift in modal 
usage away from the private car and towards public transport was desirable, because of 
the unpriced external costs of car use. 
 
The officials and consultants driving the franchising process tried to balance four 
objectives through the process: 
 
· protecting system aspects that users valued highly, such as service levels, fare levels 
and multi-modal ticketing; 
· encouraging innovation in service delivery and in responding to the marketplace; 
· providing a degree of certainty to bidders; and 
· providing incentives to drive service quality improvements and patronage growth. 
 
Final criteria used to evaluate bids were: 
 
· NPV of cash flows required from the State over the franchise period; 
· quality and thoroughness of the business plan, as a demonstration of the bidder’s 
ability to operate and manage the business in order to achieve the State’s objectives; 
· conformity of the transaction documents to the State’s expectations; 
· extent of risk transfer to the State; 
· any conditions attached to the bid; and 
· relevant experience. 
 
It is noteworthy that these criteria suggest something of a shift in emphasis away from a 
balance between service outcomes and financial consequences and more towards 
financial consequences and commercial criteria as the key objectives of reform.  This is 
probably a consequence of the reform process being centred in a Transport Reform 
Unit, established within the State Treasury, to manage the franchising process. It may 
also have been an unavoidable part of the process of moving from statements of intent 
to details of contract delivery.  Service delivery aspects were essentially handled by the 
inclusion of an Operational Performance Regime in the franchisee remuneration 
package.  A patronage incentive component was also used as a way to reward passenger 
growth. 
 
2.3 Remuneration Components 
 
Franchisees receive three major fixed payment flows from the State: 
 
· a base operating subsidy for provision of specified levels of services; 
· rolling stock payments relating to lease costs for the purchase of new rolling stock; 
· capital grants for the construction of infrastructure and rolling stock capital projects. 
 
These fixed base operating subsidies were expected to reduce to zero by 2010 (Figure 
1)2. 
                                                          
2 The “Fixed” payments in this figure include the net of fixed base operating subsidy, infrastructure lease 
payments and payments for commercial sites.  “New investment” includes new investment in rolling 
stock and other capital grants.  “Performance” payments include the variable elements of concession fare 
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Franchisees also receive variable payments for: 
 
· concession fares (topping up revenue from 50% to 75% of full fare for a concession 
passenger); 
· a patronage growth incentive, equivalent to 50% of the real growth in fare revenue 
above a threshold, where that threshold reflected revenue gains that were thought to 
be easily achievable (by reducing fare evasion); 
· operational performance bonuses/penalties for service reliability and punctuality. 
 
From these various fixed and variable payments, franchisees need to pay the State for  
leases of infrastructure owned by the State, such as track, stations and tram stops, 
together with lease payments for commercial sites (e.g. depots).  
 
Performance payments were projected by franchisees to grow from 12% of total 
payments in 1999/2000 to almost half the total payments by 2009, by which time 
operating subsidies were expected to be zero.  By 2014, almost all payments were 
expected to be performance or investment based.  Figure 1 (derived from Russell et. al 
2000, Figure 2, p. 149) shows the major expected revenue flows, as seen at the start of 
the franchise period.  
 
Fig. 1: Expected Periodic Payments to Melbourne 
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2.4 Expected Outcomes from Franchising 
 
In summary, the franchising process was expected to lead to: 
 
1. a progressive improvement in service quality available to public transport users 
- service delays reduced by about 40% over 10 years 
- a planned 11% increase in services over 10 years 
- $1.5 billion investment by the private sector in new/upgraded rolling 
stock 
- $0.8 billion to renew existing infrastructure 
                                                                                                                                                                          
payments, patronage growth incentive, operational performance bonuses/penalties and other service 
payments. 
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2. a substantial and sustained increase in PT patronage 
- 71% over 15 years 
3. much reduced long term costs of PT for the taxpayer 
- savings of over $1.8 billion in real terms over 15 years, or about $160 
million annually; 
4. risk transfer to the private sector 
- franchisees to assume revenue, operating and legal risk, except in limited 
circumstances 
- by 2009, performance-based payments to constitute almost half total 
payments to franchisees 
5. ensuring the highest safety standards are maintained 
- operator accreditation required from the Public Transport Safety 
Directorate 
- all franchisees reputable international operators. 
 
 
3. Antecedents 
 
Before reviewing the early outcomes of the franchising process, it is instructive to 
understand the context against which that process occurred.  Prior to franchising, the 
Victorian Auditor General reported that on-going annual savings of at least $245 million 
had been delivered by a transport reform program implemented earlier in the 1990s in 
provision of train and tram services, against a cash appropriation of $565 million in 
1991/923.  The major part of these savings resulted from labour shedding, with numbers 
falling from 18,000 by about 9,600 between 1992 and 1997. In 1998-99, the State cash 
cost of providing passenger rail services was $450 million, with the true economic cost 
assessed at about $850 million.   
 
The Auditor General noted that sustaining these financial benefits through a franchising 
process would require4: 
 
…that effective action is taken in two key areas, namely, successful 
implementation of the automatic ticketing system and development of a 
strategy to control and accurately monitor fare evasion within the automated 
ticketing environment. 
 
The Auditor General concluded that the 1990s transport reform program, in addition to 
reducing the call of public transport on the Victorian taxpayer, had: 
 
· improved service reliability, with the notable exception of the peak period reliability 
of the suburban train fleet, with its aged rolling stock; 
· improved punctuality, but that more needed to be done to achieve world class 
standards; 
· reversed declining patronage trends; and 
· improved service availability (e.g. a 23% increase in train suburban kilometres 
between 1991-92 and 1996-97). 
                                                          
3 Victorian Auditor General, Public Transport Reforms: Moving from a Service to a System, Report No. 
5, May, 1998, p. 1.  Capital outlays of $332 million were also incurred, together with a cost for 
accelerated superannuation of $453 million. 
4 Victorian Auditor General 1998, p. 1. 
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In short, reforms were on the right track before the franchising process began, in terms 
of governmental objectives, and had already delivered substantial gains, especially in 
the financial area. 
 
Interestingly, the Auditor General also noted that5: 
 
After 6 years of cost-cutting and rationalisation of operations, there appears 
to be limited scope for further large savings to be achieved in an environment 
where a substantial proportion of existing rolling stock will need replacement 
over the next few years. 
 
This judgement did not deter the privatisers from seeking further substantial economies!   
 
The Auditor General confirmed the need for the approaching franchised system to 
contain contractual requirements that included suitably stringent performance standards 
and incentives and penalties for operators to increase patronage and improve services. 
 
 
4. Outcomes from Franchising 
 
4.1 The High Profile Outcome 
 
It is now over three years into the franchise process, time enough to form a view on its 
early achievements. 
 
The most publicised outcome of the franchise process has been the financial failure of 
the National Express Group (NEX), the largest operator among the new franchisees.  
NEX won the right to provide one of the two metropolitan train services, one of the two 
metropolitan tram services and the regional passenger service.  NEX ceased operations 
in late 2002, only three years into the franchise process. Outstanding creditors are owed 
at least $70 million, with a likelihood of receiving about 40 cents in the dollar, or less.  
NEX has forfeited its performance bond of $135 million, which the State Government 
has indicated it is using to help meet the increased costs of future replacement services.  
At the same time, the contractual arrangements with the remaining two franchise 
operators are shifting more towards management contracts and away from the strongly 
incentive-based arrangements that characterised the initial deal. 
 
At a more detailed level, the Victorian Department of Infrastructure (DOI) and the 
Victorian State Budget report various Key Performance Indicators of the Melbourne 
public transport system.  These enable some comments about emerging patterns in 
performance, compared to the outcomes that were expected from the franchise process 
(as outlined above). 
                                                          
5 Victorian Auditor General 1998, p. 8. 
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4.2 Financial Outcomes to the State 
 
State payments to franchisees totalled $301 million in (part of) 1999/2000, about $30-40 
million less than had been forecast for that year (in current prices) and $349 million in 
2000/01, about $75 million less than had been forecast for that year (in current prices).  
This latter shortfall was mainly due to capital grants about $30 million less than 
expected and the base plus incentive payments being each about $18 million short of 
expectations.  The shortcoming in the capital grants area is probably a reflection of the 
financial troubles being experienced by franchisees at this early stage, troubles senior 
officials in the franchise companies were prepared to admit in private.   
 
The 2001/02 payment figures were broadly in line with the expected figure for that year, 
although incentive payments as an individual component were only about half the 
expected number, particularly due to shortfalls in the patronage incentive.  Patronage 
numbers were not growing as quickly as required or forecast. 
 
Within total payments to franchisees over the 2000-02 years inclusive, the franchises 
operated by NEX received over 60% of total franchisee payments from the State, these 
NEX payments averaging about $240-250 million annually.  Nonetheless, NEX was 
unable to continue its operations.  Press comment at the time the franchise was handed 
back suggested National Express was facing a write-off of over $300 million on its 
Victorian franchise investments.6 
 
The failure of one of the franchisees was not unexpected.  In February, 2002, the State 
Government committed an additional $105 million to the franchisees, with $68m. 
payable in the short term.  This was widely interpreted at the time as a bail-out, although 
part of the payments were described as “settling outstanding contractual disputes from 
the time of franchising”. 
 
The Victorian State Budget for 2003/04 continued the process of upping the financial 
commitment to the franchised services.  The Budget Papers suggest that an additional 
$1 billion over the next five years will be needed to sustain these public transport 
services, increasing the cost of the franchises from $1.75 billion to $2.75 billion over 
that period.  This is an increase of well over 50% for the period in question.   
 
Problems with the introduction of the automatic ticketing system and with levels of fare 
evasion (argued to cost about $50 million annually in terms of foregone revenue) have 
contributed to all franchisees’ financial problems, as the Auditor General had previously 
warned.  For example, almost 30% of ticketing machines on the train system were out-
of-service early in the franchise period (run under a separate contract to the franchise 
contracts).  Also, fares increased by 14% in six months, following the introduction of a 
new Commonwealth Government Goods and Services Tax (at 10%) and fare 
indexation.  This fare increase and the associated problems with the ticketing system are 
thought to have led to increased fare evasion, contributing to a fall in real total system 
fare revenue available to operators in 2000-01, even though revenue had increased 11% 
in the first year after franchising.  This real revenue reduction was a blow to the 
franchisees.  
 
                                                          
6 The Australian Financial Review (18/12/2002, p. 54) suggested a figure of about $335 million, other 
press comment suggesting even higher figures.   
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While recognising ticketing and fare evasion problems, there is little doubt that over-
optimistic bidding was a fundamental problem in the National Express failure, with cost 
savings being harder to deliver than anticipated and significant patronage gains being 
hard to realise.  The Australian Financial Review expressed it this way (AFR, 18th 
December 2002, p. 54): 
 
…the bidders were responsible for a large share of their problems.  They 
were supremely arrogant in their belief that they could replicate the 
patronage increases and cost savings achieved in Britain, and made 
commitments they couldn’t keep… 
 
The additional $200 million required annually from the State Government compares 
quite closely with the $160 million or so annual savings projected through the lives of 
the franchises, once allowance is made for inflation.  Thus, while the franchising 
process seems to have delivered financial savings in the three years to date, largely 
courtesy of the shareholders of the franchisees, it seems highly likely that these savings 
are unsustainable and that Victorian taxpayers will see no long term financial savings 
from the franchising process.  Most of the financial gains were delivered prior to 
franchising and the Auditor General seems to have got it right when he predicted in 
1998 that further financial savings would be hard to deliver.   
 
One irony of this financial outcome is that the Victorian State Government has recently 
changed its mind in favour of imposing tolls on a proposed $1.8 billion new freeway 
project, citing the public transport funding shortfall as a major reason for this policy 
change.  The public transport sector will push for this pricing switch on tolling to be 
generalised towards a more comprehensive program of reform in land transport pricing.   
 
 
4.3 Service Quality 
 
Improvements in service quality were a central rationale for the franchising process.  
What has been achieved?  A small number of service quality indicators are measured 
and reported by the Victorian Department of Infrastructure, enabling some conclusions 
on trends in these areas to be drawn. 
 
Figure 2 shows that there have been improvements in on-time running, with three of the 
four metropolitan train/tram franchises showing improved performance.7  Traffic 
congestion on shared rights-of-way is posing major concerns for the tram franchisee 
whose performance deteriorated.  The franchising target was for 40% reduction in 
service delays within ten years.  The on-time running data suggests that three of the four 
businesses are on track, or better, in this regard. 
 
Data for the first quarter of 2003 (later than that shown in Figure 2), shows that since 
the demise of NEX and the taking back of these services by the State Government, the 
on-time running performance of the train and tram businesses the group had operated 
has deteriorated.  This confirms the suggestion from Figure 2 that franchising has 
helped to improve service punctuality.   
 
                                                          
7 Source: Department of Infrastructure, Track Record, Numbers 3 (2000) and 13 (2003). 
Melbourne’s Public Transport Franchising:  Lessons for PPPs 
Stanley & Hensher 
9 
Fig 2: On-time performance of Melbourne's trains and 
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Figure 3 shows service cancellations on metropolitan train and tram services, as an 
indicator of reliability.8  These show a similar pattern to the on-time running results, 
with the two train services and one tram service showing improvement but the other 
tram service marking time.   
 
As with on-time running, data for the first quarter of 2003 shows that service 
cancellations on the prior NEX services have increased since these services were taken 
back by the State Government, reinforcing the conclusion that franchising tended to 
improve service quality. 
 
 
4.4 New Vehicles 
 
A major objective of the franchising process was to see rolling stock upgraded, because 
of the expected impact this would have on patronage.  To date, 36 new Citidas trams 
have been brought into service and 59 new Combino trams will have been delivered by 
December 2004.  In addition, over 300 trams will have been refurbished by December 
2003.  The upgrading of the tram fleet is probably the most visible outcome of the 
privatisation process, representing a significant lift in quality.  Upgrading the train fleet 
has been slower. 
                                                          
8 Department of Infrastructure, Track Record, Numbers 3 (2000) and 13 (2003). 
Fig 3: Cancellations of Melbourne trains and tram services 
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Overall, the rolling stock upgrade program appears to have been delivered on-time and 
on-budget, with few operational performance problems.  It is likely that the new 
vehicles would not be there if there had not been the prospect of substantial cost savings 
from franchising.  The sustainability of the upgrade program, under higher cost 
structures, becomes more problematic.    
 
 
4.5 Increases in Services 
 
Over the three years from 1999/2000 to 2002/03, total kilometres operated by trains and 
trams on the Melbourne network increased by almost 5%, most of this increase in 
kilometres being on the train system (+1.3 million vkms, or +8.4%, in a total increase of 
1.8mvkms).  This was a lower rate of overall increase than over the period immediately 
prior to franchising (see “Antecedents” section above) but is in line with the expectation 
that services would increase by about 11% over 10 years.   
 
Service frequency and coverage and speed/reliability are generally agreed to be the 
major drivers of growth in public transport patronage in Melbourne.  It is difficult to see 
how the franchisees could ever meet their patronage forecasts with only very modest 
targets for growth in services.  In short, franchising has met its expectation in terms of 
early growth in services but this expectation seems far too low to be consistent with 
achieving the patronage growth forecast. 
 
 
4.6 Patronage 
 
Patronage increases have been achieved.  Total patronage on the metropolitan train and 
tram system was 257.3 million passengers in 2000/01, increasing to 270.9 million in 
2002/03, an increase of 5.3% over two years.  This is a good result, by comparison with 
the recent past, but is about 1% per annum less than was expected from the franchise 
bids.  This shortfall is not unexpected in terms of the modest growth in service 
kilometres.   
 
Tram patronage increased by 6.2%, faster than the rate of growth in train patronage of 
4.4% over this period.  With the growth in train service kilometres being much faster 
than that in tram kilometres, the likelihood is that improvements in the tram fleet have 
driven increases in tram patronage. 
 
 
4.7 Risk Transfer 
 
The financial changes that have occurred over the past 18 months suggest that not a 
great deal of lasting risk transfer from the public to the private sector has been 
achieved!!! Additional payments have been made to franchisees and one franchisee has 
failed financially.  This will result in a need to increase payments from government to 
sustain services.  The major expected recipients of the increased payments are the 
surviving train and tram operators, who are likely to see their franchises expanded in 
spatial coverage and shortened in time span.  A more appropriate risk management 
philosophy is emerging.  Rather than simply seeking to transfer risk from the public to 
the private sector, as in the initial franchise process, the new contracts will seek to 
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assign risk to the party most able to manage it.  This reflects a trend towards more of a 
partnership relationship. 
 
 
4.8 Safety Outcomes 
 
Improvements in safety were one of the objectives of the franchising process.  There is 
no published data available to suggest whether or not this has been achieved and 
anecdotal evidence is mixed.  Some franchisees have achieved significant 
improvements but this experience is apparently not the rule.  Conclusion = no 
conclusion at present! 
 
 
4.9 Customer satisfaction 
 
Regular measurement and reporting of customer satisfaction has existed for many years 
on the Victorian public transport services.  These surveys show no significant trends 
over the period of franchising.  Satisfaction levels rose for one tram operator around the 
time new vehicles were introduced into its fleet but have drifted back since, to be 
marginally above levels at the start of the franchise.  Satisfaction with the other tram 
franchise has fluctuated around the starting level.  Satisfaction with the two train 
operators has shown similar patterns.  In short, customers are reporting no significant 
shift in satisfaction levels either up or down. 
 
Market research conducted for the private operators suggests that dissatisfaction with 
the ticketing system and concerns about perceived security around rail stations may be 
the main reasons why customer satisfaction levels are not rising, even though there is 
hard evidence of improvements in some aspects of service quality.  Marketing efforts 
are seeking to communicate these improvements to customers and deal with perceived 
concerns.     
 
 
5. Overview 
 
This review of the recent public transport franchising experience in Victoria indicates 
that the objective of reducing the call on the public purse has not been met and was, in 
reality, never likely to be met.  Significant cost savings were achieved prior to 
franchising, when large reductions in the public transport workforce were achieved, and 
delivering further large cost savings was always going to be difficult in the extreme, as 
the Auditor General predicted.   
 
Franchising has seen an improvement in the quality of tram rollingstock, in particular, 
and improvements in a number of service quality indicators, such as on-time running.  
However, growth in service kilometres has been slower than in the period prior to 
franchising.  Patronage increases have accelerated compared to the period prior to 
franchising but by less than the franchisees’ forecast.  Risk transfer to the private sector 
has not been anywhere near as much as intended.  Customer satisfaction levels are not 
showing any marked recognition of franchising having been beneficial to users.   
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Overall, this form of competitive tendering has not delivered many of the forecast 
benefits for Victorians.    
 
 
6. Why Has The Process Failed to Deliver? 
 
6.1 Operator Motivations and Governmental Reform Ideology 
 
A seasoned transport planner looking at the franchisees’ forecasts of patronage growth 
and growth in service kilometres would almost certainly conclude they simply did not 
add up.   Going further, when the period of cost-cutting that was undertaken during the 
90s is recognised, one must wonder where franchisees expected to achieve major 
additional cost savings.  This leads to two key questions. 
 
6.1.1 What were the franchisees’ motivations?   
Did they think they could achieve cost levels well below what had hitherto been 
possible?  Perhaps their international networks might open up economies of scope and 
scale that were not available locally.  This seems unlikely and the State Auditor General 
did not expect to see major new cost reductions, as indicated previously.   
 
Were they engaged in buying market share, with a view to subsequent upwards contract 
price adjustments?  Quite possibly.  We call this playing “capture the regulator”, a 
phenomenon commented on by other observers of franchising processes, such as 
Alexandersson and Hulten (2003) in their analysis of competitive tenders in Swedish 
public transport.  The argument goes along the line that, with a financially troubled 
franchisee in place, it is easier for a government to increase payments to that operator to 
continue service than to face the political odium of major service disruptions.  The 
additional payments made by the Victorian Government during 2002 give some 
credence to this view, being widely seen as a bail-out in the local media at the time.   
 
Were the successful franchisees victims of what some more charitably call the 
“winner’s curse”?  In other words, did they simply get it wrong on the numbers, due to 
carelessness or ignorance.  Possibly but this is a very charitable view, given the vast 
international experience of the franchisees!   It might explain part of the outcome, given 
the extent of fare evasion that has been taking place on the system.  However, the 
revenue estimated to be foregone because of fare evasion is about $50 million, only 
one-quarter the additional annual amount the State Treasurer has indicated will be 
required to keep the services going.   
 
6.1.2 What about those managing the franchise process?   
Why did they accept bids that, to a seasoned transport planner, were unsustainable?  
Ideology is the likely answer.  The whole process was grounded in a strongly held 
political view at the time that the private sector would do it better and that competitive 
tendering would deliver the result.  Privatisation across a whole range of fields, where 
provision was previously in the hands of government agencies, was being undertaken 
during this time.   
 
Melbourne’s Public Transport Franchising:  Lessons for PPPs 
Stanley & Hensher 
13 
While “before and after” assessments were undertaken as part of the analysis of 
franchisee bids, we know of no evidence to show that those managing the franchise 
process undertook benchmarking analyses with comparable public transport services 
overseas.  Any such benchmarking would have shown, for example, that sustaining 
patronage increases of the order forecast by franchisees is exceptional, especially given 
projected increases in service kilometres, and that major reduction in subsidy 
requirements, as forecast, is uncommon if the start point is after a major program of 
labour shedding has been undertaken.  The franchise process seems to be partly guilty, 
at least, of being too caught up in the hype of promoting competition as an end in itself!  
Ideology, it seems, triumphed over understanding. 
 
For the latter situation to have developed, a major gap at the tactical level in the public 
transport planning and service delivery process in the State must be recognised as a 
significant contributory factor.  Following Macario (2001), we identify three elements 
in the configuration of an urban public transport system (as part of the wider urban 
transport/land use system): 
 
· the strategic level (S) = government outcome goals for public transport, 
typically covering matters such as access, safety, economic and environmental 
dimensions.  This is the level at which political trade-offs take place to define 
answers to meeting stakeholder needs subject to constrained budgets; 
 
· the tactical level  (T) = design of the transport system/service, including the 
roles to be performed by the respective modes, detailing of the policy means of 
translating the strategic outcome goals into operational specifications and 
drawing the boundaries between the roles of the regulator and the operator.  This 
stage is normally the regulator’s domain, as it is in Melbourne (although there is 
increasing international interest in the private sector pushing into this level).  A 
common problem at the tactical level is the absence of adequate system 
definition, with individual operators left to pursue their own interests in a 
manner that misses broader opportunities for economies of scale and scope.  
Grey areas include the boundaries between the regulator and the operator in 
system design and development.  The tactical stage is widely recognised 
internationally as a major gap in the public transport planning/delivery system 
and Melbourne is no exception.  10-15 year service delivery contracts will 
always struggle when there are no intact system-wide planning/delivery 
frameworks to match.  Our personal view is that the Victorian Government 
during the late 1990s lost sight of its public transport system as it focused on 
franchising separate services.  The subsequent Victorian Government is 
attempting to fill this tactical gap at present but is in recovery mode in so doing 
and will always struggle with the short term Treasury influence dominating 
budget processes, on which public transport is so dependent; 
 
· the operational level (O)  = production and consumption of transport services.  
If the strategic and tactical levels are well developed, this should be relatively 
easy! 
 
Franchising in Melbourne essentially involved moving from public to private operators 
at the operational level, with little content at the strategic level, a weak tactical level and 
a team managing the franchising process who seemed to lack deep understanding of 
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public transport economics.  Again, ideology is no substitute for clear goals, a clear 
systemic view of how these will be achieved and a bit of knowledge about what will 
work and within what bounds.  Franchising was doomed to failure in such an 
environment. 
 
6.2 Competitive Tendering versus Negotiated (Performance 
Based) Contracts 
 
Competitive Tendering (CT) as a means of selecting franchisees (part of the ideology of 
the process) has some inherent problems that were not recognised adequately in the 
franchise process.  After a decade or so during which CT experienced something of a 
honeymoon, there are now several areas of concern, such as: 
 
· a tendency to focus too heavily on cost minimisation, at the expense of service 
quality, an issue highlighted many times in the THREDBO series of conferences 
on Competition and Ownership in Public Transport; 
 
· open to the prospect of predatory pricing, as outlined by Alexandersson and 
Hulten (2003), although this is possibly less of an issue with longer term 
contracts, such as applied in Melbourne’s franchises; 
 
· open to the risk of franchisees playing capture the regulator, as discussed above; 
 
· as a process for selecting several franchisees, it is not compatible with social 
welfare optimisation across the entire system (Hensher and Stanley, 2003), 
unless there are add-on negotiations at the system level between the regulator 
and set of operators; and 
 
· it focuses on ex ante bidding positions rather than negotiated adjustments over 
time.  In fact, the more that negotiated adjustments are used over time, to deal 
with changing circumstances, the weaker is the appeal of CT in terms of 
transparency (one of its main advantages). 
 
These concerns do not rule out competitive tendering as a process but they weaken its 
appeal and suggest, for example, that it may have little advantage over negotiated 
(performance based) contracts if there are incumbent operators with good track 
records, provided those proven performers face the threat of competition if they stop 
performing.  Service/cost benchmarking (“virtual competition”) can assist this process 
of helping to ensure cost effective service delivery with negotiated contracts.  This is the 
approach the Victorian Government is taking to re-franchising, an approach that is 
supported by the present authors.   
 
The requirement for clear outcome goals and a well developed Tactical level must, of 
course, complement improved franchising processes at the operational level. This 
approach is consistent with the emerging trend in construction and other major project 
contracting towards project alliancing, where negotiated agreements and sharing of 
risks and rewards in an uncertain operational environment are features, with competitive 
tendering taking more of a back seat.9 
                                                          
9 See, for example, Ross (2003). 
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If negotiated contracts are to play a larger role, how should remuneration be structured?   
The aim should be to line up key elements of operator remuneration with governmental 
outcome objectives from service provision.  Governments typically support public 
transport because of: 
 
· its capacity to meet social obligations  (e.g. provision of transport options for 
transport disadvantaged groups); and 
 
· its capacity to reduce the (unpriced) external costs of private car use for all sources 
of intra- and inter-sectoral externality, while providing benefits to public transport 
users. 
 
Contractual remuneration systems should thus seek to separately reward service 
providers with respect to: 
 
· the community service obligations (CSO) of government in public transport service 
provision, through payment for provision of minimum service levels (MSLs, where 
these MSLs will probably be expressed in high level terms such as vehicle 
kilometres of service per geographic area) at efficient cost levels (achieved through 
best-practice benchmarking).  Key performance indicators (KPIs) can be used to 
reward/penalize operators for their performance in delivering against these CSOs, 
such KPIs relating (for example) to on-time running, safety, environmental 
performance, etc; and, 
 
· incentive components related to (1) the creation of public transport user benefits 
and (2) additional external benefits from attracting passengers from private cars to 
public transport, both these incentive components flowing from service 
improvements.10  The public transport user benefit component is an important 
ingredient since, under the regulated fare environments that characterize many 
public transport service contracts, operators are constrained in their ability to be 
rewarded for user benefits that flow from their service initiatives.  The external cost 
component is vital because of the scale of these costs from road use, assessed 
nationally at about three times the scale of road user tax/charge payments for road 
use in Australia (BIC 2001), and the urgency to take action to reduce the costs, as 
part of the development of more sustainable land transport systems. 
 
The idea of PBCs in public transport is not new and has received strong and growing 
support in Europe, especially in Scandinavian countries (Carlquist 2001, Johansen et al 
2001), where several Regional Authorities in Norway have rejected competitive 
tendering except as a last resort strategy (i.e. non-compliance under PBC’s).   
 
Competitive tendering might still be used, of course, to develop a short-list of parties 
with whom negotiations would take place to select a preferred supplier for a new service 
or for a service where the incumbent is not meeting expectations. 
 
 
 
                                                          
10 A paper by Wallis and Gale (2001) to the Thredbo 7 Conference in Norway illustrated the application 
of an approach along the latter lines. 
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6.3 Area Agreements/Quality Partnerships 
 
In a multi-operator environment, how can social welfare optimisation across the system 
be achieved?   This requires a mechanism for negotiating outcomes across the set of 
relevant operators and the regulator.  This is an important element of service delivery at 
the system level because of: 
 
· potential cost efficiencies and service quality improvements that are achievable 
if operators work in partnership to deliver services that cross modes and/or 
service franchises (e.g. system marketing; service connectivity); 
 
· the scope for operators to deliver cost savings if governments are prepared to 
commit to forward programs of service delivery enhancements, such as on-road 
priority treatments for trams and buses and forward funding commitments for 
improved MSLs (which may create opportunities for service rationalisation to 
achieve economies). 
 
Quality Partnerships have been developed in the UK as a means of encouraging such 
system synergies.  These are specific to the needs of the somewhat unique UK 
regulatory environment within which public transport operates but the general idea of 
having a formal mechanism to encourage partnerships or co-operation between groups 
of operators and the regulator is laudable. 
 
The regulatory environment for metropolitan bus operation in Australia is different to 
that in the UK but the idea of using an agreement of some form between government 
and the set of bus operators in Melbourne to meet government transport objectives is 
being promoted by the Victorian bus industry as a means of contributing to service 
enhancement and more sustainable transport systems.  Bus Association Victoria has 
proposed to the Victorian State Government that the industry and government sign off 
on an agreement that includes jointly agreed objectives.  This would require the 
government to: 
 
· make a minimum five year forward commitment to funding bus services at an 
increased level and to specifying a development plan that reflects these 
commitments (prepared in partnership with the industry and local government); 
 
· commit to a five year program of bus priority and related infrastructure and 
enforcement measures (again prepared in consultation with the industry and 
local government); and  
 
· commit to a number of other procedural matters (e.g. relating to contract 
renewals). 
 
The agreement then commits the bus industry (under such a quality partnership) to: 
 
· ensuring that service efficiencies released by the government’s commitments are 
converted to improved services at marginal cost; 
 
· negotiating changes in franchise areas where this is needed to improve service 
effectiveness; 
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· opening up some service areas to competitive tendering (e.g. new cross-town 
services);11 
 
· ensuring that all operators and their vehicles meet modern safety and 
environmental standards; 
 
· meeting best-practice cost levels for service provision; and 
 
· working co-operatively with the State and local governments on service 
development planning, contract reviews, etc. 
 
Additional commitments are nominated for local government at the area level.  
Individual bus contracts would then reflect this overarching strategic framework. 
 
While this approach has not been agreed at this time by the State Government, the 
Victorian bus industry is convinced that a partnership approach along such lines will 
lead to less expensive, more effective service provision at the metropolitan level.  It will 
assist in breaking down the “them and us” approach that typically characterises 
regulator-provider service contracts and associated relationships, encourage operators to 
price services taking into account government program commitments, and protect the 
interests of the Victorian public, particularly because of the benchmarking approach.   
Most importantly, it will help to fill out the content of that most difficult tactical level 
within the service delivery framework. 
 
6.4 Risk Sharing 
 
While the intent of the franchise process was risk transfer to the private sector, the 
subsequent additional funding commitments by the State government indicate that the 
process failed miserably on this front.  Subsequent thinking is to move from a process 
that simply seeks to transfer risk to the private sector to one that locates risk with the 
party most able to manage it.   
 
Production risk is widely agreed to be a matter for the operator to manage.  Revenue 
risk is more problematic, since it is influenced by some aspects of service delivery that 
are under operator control and by other things beyond operator control.  For example, 
traffic congestion is affected by government road and traffic management programs, 
including parking programs, as well as by serendipity (e.g. traffic accidents due to bad 
weather).  Traffic congestion affects the on-road performance of trams and buses and 
influences patronage levels.  A government might expect a franchise bidder to make 
estimates of how this will impact on performance but, at the end of the day, it is a pretty 
hard ask in the absence of clear government intentions about its future road programs on 
specific links.  Some means of risk sharing on the revenue side is thus more likely to be 
a fair approach to contracts than simply expecting the operator to make educated 
guesses and build these into bids. 
 
                                                          
11 Because most bus services in Melbourne were started by private operators and run for many years from 
the farebox, the bus industry has long argued that operators have a legitimate equity interest in the bus 
routes they initiated, even though government now subsidises service provision.  This position has been 
successfully defended in the court system in the past. 
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It is noteworthy that, in tenders for public transport services, there are few net cost 
contracts.  Net cost contracts expose the operator to both production and revenue 
(including patronage) risk.  Gross cost contracts remove the revenue side risk.  These 
are far more common in public transport.  Gross cost contracts (e.g. covering minimum 
service levels, as argued previously), with additional elements that reward an operator 
for building patronage and delivering additional service (e.g. of benefit to existing 
users) are tending to be the approach adopted in Australia. 
 
7. Melbourne’s Emerging New Arrangements 
 
The franchising of public transport in Victoria in 1999, as reviewed earlier in this paper, 
used competitive tendering processes to select franchisees.  Following the failure of the 
National Express Group franchises and financial stresses on the remaining franchisees, 
the State Government is preparing replacement arrangements for the franchised 
services.  These replacement arrangements seem likely to involve: 
 
· one train and one tram franchise for Melbourne;  
· centralised metropolitan network functions (e.g. marketing, revenue distribution 
from the common ticketing system) handled by a separate organisation whose 
shareholders will be the public transport franchisees; 
· shorter franchise periods;  
· an opportunity for the parties to negotiate a contract extension at the end of the 
(shorter) franchise, as an alternative to re-tendering; and 
· remuneration arrangements that include an operational performance regime 
(with KPIs), a service quality incentive and a service growth incentive, the latter 
two elements being similar in intent to the user benefit and externality 
components of remuneration proposed by Hensher and Stanley (2003). 
 
This approach is very much in line with the performance based approach and a 
significant move away from the blind adherence to competitive tendering that 
characterised the earlier process. 
 
 
8. Concluding Comments 
 
Franchising of public transport in Victoria provides a recent clear example of the need 
for realistic expectations in regulator-provider relationships.  The Victorian experience 
suggests that competitive tendering is no substitute for a hard-nosed assessment of what 
is possible in terms of service delivery and service costs.  Franchising in Victoria, Mark 
II, will look different, relying more heavily on a (performance-linked) negotiated 
outcome with existing service providers who have survived the carnage from the first 
round of franchising.   
 
The paper argues that, once private sector public transport service providers are in 
place, negotiated contracts may provide the best opportunity to move closer to a social 
optimum in service provision than competitively tendered contracts.  The threat of 
tendering is always available to encourage performance compliance but the Victorian 
experience is that competitive tendering can encourage excessively optimistic forecasts 
that are, in essence, undeliverable. The recent compelling evidence by Flyvbjerg et al 
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(2003) that large infrastructure projects in all sectors investigated (predominantly 
transportation) exhibit substantial cost overruns provides further supporting evidence to 
the Victorian Franchise experience.12 Negotiated contracts may provide more 
sustainable service outcomes, with mechanisms such as benchmarking and open book 
accounting practices available to assure public accountability.  
 
At the same time, successful public=private partnerships in public transport demand a 
well developed Tactical level, where system planning work takes place.  This area needs 
improvement in Australia.  Public transport reform has tended to focus on the service 
provider.  It is not time to shift the focus on to the regulator, where change has been far 
less than at service delivery level. 
 
In a geographic area where there are multiple operators, with their own exclusive 
operating areas, the paper argues for government and the set of operators to agree a 
service development framework that includes major commitments from each side and 
where the emphasis is on partnering in the pursuit of service objectives.   
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